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A B S T R A C T . In the wake of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) suspending its

name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) rules that prevented college athletes from entering paid
endorsements and other sponsorship deals, ensuring access to legal representation and sports
agents when making NIL deals is vital to protecting college athletes, as well as their universities
and conferences. Given that nearly thirty states have enacted their own NIL legislation, the need
for federal legislation is ever-mounting. Not only can it provide relief in establishing a national
framework, but it can also guarantee representation to college athletes, thereby protecting their
rights and obligations and being paid a fair market rate, while complying with state laws. Although
access to representation could be provided through NCAA bylaws or perhaps constituting college
athletes as university employees, these means prove inadequate. In analyzing current proposed
bills, this article argues that they will fail to garner bipartisan support but borrows their framework
to recommend a feasible way to provide access to representation.
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INTRODUCTION

“I’m so happy to be done with the [National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”)] and their rules & regulation[s]. They do any & everything to exploit[]
collegiate athletes,” tweeted former Ohio State University quarterback Cardale
Jones.1 He continued, “It’s deeper than athletes thinking we should get paid. The
[NCAA] control our lives with insane and unfair rules.”2 Seattle Seahawks defensive
end and former University of Texas A&M athlete Michael Bennett separately
expressed, “I think the NCAA is one of the biggest scams in America.”3 Bennett
continued, “These kids put so much on the line. . . . I think there are very few schools
that actually care about the players.”4
The NCAA has ingrained itself so deeply within intercollegiate athletics, it
has ostensibly become an American staple. In 2021, 16.9 million viewers tuned into
the NCAA March Madness championship game.5 Football teams at schools like the
universities of Texas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania State University
have earned profits between $40 million and $80 million annually, while paying their
coaches multimillion-dollar salaries.6 Despite the rising commercialization within
intercollegiate athletics that has increasingly developed intercollegiate
competitions to mirror their professional counterparts, the NCAA justifies enforcing
a comprehensive regulatory scheme on its college athletes through the concept of
“amateurism.”7 The NCAA argues that intercollegiate athletics must preserve a level
of amateurism, and failure to do that would destroy the integrity and appeal of
college sports.8 This preservation historically included a prohibition on students
from commercializing their athlete status while in school, all while the NCAA

1

Cardale Jones (@CJ1two), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2016, 12:57 PM), https://twitter.com/CJ1two
/status/719569962134847488 [https://perma.cc/398X-644G].
2

Cardale Jones Explains Tweets, Problems with NCAA Rules, ESPN (Apr. 12, 2016), https:/
/www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/15190171/cardale-jones-calling-ncaa-playerscannot [https://perma.cc/T966-YNT3].
3

Terry Blount, Seahawks Stars Rant Against NCAA, ESPN (Jan. 29, 2015), https:/
/www.espn.com/nfl/playoffs/2014/story/_/id/12249290/richard-sherman-michael-bennettseattle-seahawks-bash-ncaa [https://perma.cc/X3F6-CXTS].
4

Id.

5

Christina Gough, NCAA March Madness Basketball Tournament Championship Game Viewers
from 2013 to 2021, STATISTA (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/244249/ncaabasketball-march-madness-average-audience-per-game/ [https://perma.cc/H6RB-NBJB].
6

Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATL. (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ [https://perma.cc/6DAE
-B5C4].
7

Id.

8

Id.
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continues to exploit the skills and fame of its young athletes.9
Following mounting public pressure, however, the NCAA began to loosen
its rigid restrictions to maintain a level of amateurism by relaxing rules preventing
athletes from commercializing their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”) rights.10 In
2021, the NCAA suspended its prohibition on college athletes entering paid
endorsements and other sponsorship deals.11 This regulatory shift further permits
these athletes the ability to use agents to manage their publicity.12 Following this
change in policy, college athletes began rushing into NIL deals, flocking to reap
financial rewards that had been previously unattainable.13 Yet, many athletes failed
to consider the significant legal implications created by these NIL deals, such as each
athlete’s ongoing contractual obligations, tax implications, and any state law and
NCAA policy that may apply.14
In light of this newfound ability to earn compensation and the novel legal
concerns implicated by such dealings, equity calls for college athletes to be required
access to appropriate legal representation. Due to the NCAA’s inability to adapt,
states forced open the floodgates to allow for college athletes to engage in NIL
deals.15 Thus, the NCAA was left without any enforcement procedures, leaving
behind a market that is virtually unpoliced and unregulated.16 This entry point has
enabled predatory enterprises to negotiate unfair contracts with unsophisticated
and unrepresented college athletes. By granting proper access to representation,
college athletes can become informed of their rights and obligations by entering a
contract and save significant time, energy, and money down the road. For example,
YOKE gaming, which allows users to play video games with participating athletes,
offered to pay college athletes approximately $20 in exchange for an endorsement
on social media.17 In failing to recognize the legal ramifications of YOKE’s contract
9

Id.

10

Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NCAA (June
30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/news/2021/6/30/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-imageand-likeness-policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/VX57-GW4N].
11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Leah Vann, One Week into NIL, Lawyers Caution Athletes on Barstool, YOKE Gaming and
Misinformation that Could Affect Iowa Athletes, GAZETTE (July 11, 2021, 6:00 AM), https:/
/www.thegazette.com/iowa-hawkeyes/one-week-into-nil-lawyers-caution-athletes-on-barstoolyoke-gaming-and-misinformation-that-could-a/ [https://perma.cc/UW5V-9MP7].
15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Aaron R. Klein et al., NIL Update – Should Student Athletes Seek Professional Advice?, STITES &
HARBISON PLLC (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.stites.com/resources/client-alerts/nil-update-shouldstudent-athletes-seek-professional-advice [https://perma.cc/A85X-9JCY].
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provisions, several members of the University of Iowa football team agreed to the
contract, unaware they were signing away their rights to the provided content via a
perpetual, royalty-free, and irrevocable grant.18 Therefore, YOKE was granted free
use of their NIL-bearing content forever.19 Had there been a representative present
when negotiating the deal, however, these athletes would have been made aware
of this conflict and guided to ensure the appropriate market value for their images.
Payment itself resulting from NIL contracts can pose material risks to
college athletes. NCAA policy still bans athletes from contracts that contain pay-toplay and performance-based payments.20 Thus, athletes are responsible for
ensuring their new deals cannot be tied directly to their performance as an athlete.
Further, any financial aid recipients should be aware that income from NIL deals
could impact their need-based aid.21 In addition, in the case of the YOKE contract,
athletes must navigate the fairness of any contract they enter, including retention
of rights, fair market value, and other considerations present when negotiating
against a sophisticated party. These concerns can be addressed by competent
agents representing college athletes.
Universities, although possessing sufficient concern, cannot represent
college athletes in NIL negotiations. Universities may provide platforms to advise
college athletes,22 but they cannot provide direct guidance in negotiating and
drafting contracts.23 In large part, this is the result of state laws prohibiting
universities from directly negotiating or representing college athletes in NIL deals
given their inherent conflict of interest.24 For example, the University of Louisville
recently advised its college athletes to cease all relationships with Barstool Sports.25
This can be attributed to Penn National, a company that owns and operates casinos

18

Vann, supra note 14.

19

Id.

20

Noah Hock, Navigating the Uncertain Terrain of NIL Deals for Student Athletes, BROOKS PIERCE
(Dec. 12, 2021), https://www.brookspierce.com/publication-navigating-the-uncertain-terrain-ofnil-deals-for-student-athletes [https://perma.cc/5C6P-NER3].
21

Id.

22

Name, Image, Likeness,
[https://perma.cc/U5R9-5BXE].
23

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,

https://ohiostatebuckeyes.com/nil

Klein, supra note 17.

24

Id.; see also Laws for College Athlete Name, Image, and Likeness Rights: 50-State Survey,
JUSTIA (Oct. 2021), https://www.justia.com/sports-law/college-athlete-name-image-and-likenessrights-50-state-survey/ [https://perma.cc/4MFN-VSJ9].
25

Vann, supra note 14; see also Ransom Campbell, Louisville Tells Student-Athletes to Cease NIL
Involvement with Barstool Sports, TALKING POINTS SPORTS (Aug. 11, 2021), https:/
/talkingpointssports.com/college-football/college-sports/louisville-tells-student-athletes-tocease-nil-involvement-with-barstool-sports/ [https://perma.cc/K675-995U].
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and advertises tobacco and alcohol products, owning a 36 percent stake in Barstool
Sports.26 Thus, the university found that Barstool does not comply with the
university’s policies or Kentucky’s executive order allowing college athletes to profit
from NIL deals.27 Tensions like these illustrate the basic conflict of interest that
precludes universities from being able to adequately represent their athletes in
contract negotiations.
The NCAA has long held the opportunity to act as an advocate for its
athletes. By controlling the landscape of collegiate sports, it is natural to believe that
they are in the best position to be able to protect the interests of their students.
However, their history of inaction has proven that they will instead leave college
athletes to fend for themselves. As such, the NCAA cannot be relied upon to provide
adequate resources or representation to its athletes and their interests.
This Note explains the numerous legal issues that surround the NCAA
following the redevelopment of its NIL regulations. Part I provides a brief history of
the NCAA. Part II discusses issues regarding college athletes that must be resolved
through federal legislation. Part III argues that, at minimum, congressional action is
necessary to ensure access to adequate legal representation to collegiate athletes.
I.

THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCATION LANDSCAPE

A. NCAA Formation
The National Collegiate Athletic Association was born as a means to
promote safer practices in men’s college football.28 In 1905 alone, the sport saw
eighteen deaths and hundreds of injuries.29 That year, President Theodore
Roosevelt called for a review of sports safety procedures in football, calling upon its
sixty-two original member universities to establish the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association (“IAA”).30 The IAA was officially established as a rule-making body to
promote safety in sports, and took its present name, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, in 1910.31
In its early years, the NCAA’s role was largely confined to rulemaking and
26

Vann, supra note 14.

27

Id.

28

History, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/4/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/5SSSV9B4].
29

Id.; see, e.g., Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000).
30

NCAA, supra note 28.

31

Id.
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tournament scheduling.32 A spike in college enrollment from returning military
personnel following World War II, coupled with the mass adoption of personal
televisions, resulted in greater public interest in intercollegiate athletics.33 As such,
the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics also grew.34 In 1948, the NCAA
responded by adopting the Sanity Code, to “alleviate the proliferation of exploitive
practices in the recruitment of student-athletes.”35 These rules signaled a move by
the NCAA to instill a notion of amateurism into college sports, by enforcing
regulations controlling everything from financial aid to recruitment, and academic
standards. Essentially, the adoption of the Sanity Code thereby granted NCAA
executives a de-facto authority over managing the burgeoning collegiate athletic
industry.36
In facing unprecedented legal and social challenges threatening to alter the
landscape of intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA was handed a major loss in the case
of O’Bannon v. NCAA.37 In 2009, former UCLA basketball star, Ed O’Bannon, filed a
lawsuit against the NCAA and Collegiate Licensing Company alleging the NCAA’s
amateurism rules constituted illegal restraints on trade under the Sherman Act and
their actions deprived him of his right to publicity, after seeing himself in a video
game.38 O’Bannon argued that the NCAA profited from students’ name and image
because they prevented college athletes from exploiting those same rights.39 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and found that the NCAA’s rules
barring payments to college athletes were in violation of antitrust laws.40 In doing
so, the court issued an injunction against the enforcement of rules that prohibited
athletes from earning money from the use of their names and images in video games
and television broadcasts.41 The Supreme Court denied the NCAA’s appeal,42 and
32

Smith, supra note 29, at 13.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id. at 14.

36

NCAA, supra note 28.

37

802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).

38

The NCAA Lawsuit, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-and-marchmadness/ncaa-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/6M8P-DBQA].
39

Id.

40

Ben Strauss & Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Must Allow Colleges to Pay Athletes, Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/sports/federal-judge-rules-againstncaa-in-obannon-case.html [https://perma.cc/78BA-PAL8].
41

Id.

42

Marc Edelman, By Denying Certiorari in O’Bannon v. NCAA, The Supreme Court Aids Future
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the NCAA was ordered to pay the plaintiffs $42.4 million in fees and costs.43
Today, the NCAA defines itself as “a member-led organization focused on
cultivating an environment that emphasizes academics, fairness and well-being
across college sports.”44 In boasting 1,100 member schools and more than 500,000
college athletes,45 they are involved in regulating “everything from recruiting and
compliance to academics and championships,” 46 a far cry from its initial charge of
promoting safety.
B. Name, Image, and Likeness
Although the NCAA publicly champions the idea that college athletes are
scholars first, athletes second,47 it has long feared that adding compensation to the
equation will jeopardize the innocence and honesty associated with this ideal, and
ultimately blur the line between professional and collegiate athletics.48 Thus, it has
steadfastly committed to its notion of “amateurism” in repeatedly declining to allow
compensation for its college athletes. However, given the lack of persuasive
justification for such denial of compensation to continue, the California legislature
unanimously passed the Fair Pay to Play Act in 2019 to allow athletes to pursue
endorsement deals and hire agents to advise on those deals.49 Since its passage,

Reform to College Sports, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2016, 10:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/marcedelman/2016/10/07/by-denying-certiorari-in-obannon-v-ncaa-the-supreme-court-aidsfuture-reform-to-college-sports/?sh=2e3cdf3b270f [https://perma.cc/Z4SF-RANT].
43

See Memorandum, O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 739 Fed. Appx. 890
(9th Cir. 2018), https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2018/06/29/16-15803.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EWW-S7K9].
44

Mission and Priorities, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/6/28/mission-andpriorities.aspx [https://perma.cc/98NE-VQSA].
45
46

Id.

Overview,
NCAA,
[https://perma.cc/LUV4-EKB8].

https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/16/overview.aspx

47

National Collegiate Athletic Association, DIVISION I 2021-22 MANUAL 1 (Aug. 1, 2021), https:/
/web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008 [https://perma.cc/KJ2L-BQQC].
48

Andy Staples, Delaney: Big Ten Could De-emphasize Athletics if O’Bannon Plaintiffs Win,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.si.com/college/2013/03/19/big-ten-jim-delanyncaa-obannon [https://perma.cc/HZ72-A4Z3].
49

Dean Golembeski, NCAA Struggles to Keep Its Hold on College Sports, BEST COLLS.

(Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.bestcolleges.com/news/analysis/2021/09/22/ncaa-college-sportsnil-supreme-court-lobbying/ [https://perma.cc/JS9K-ZFXU]; Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness
Legislation by State, BUS. COLL. SPORTS (Mar. 12, 2022), https://businessofcollegesports.com
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nearly thirty other state legislatures followed by enacting nearly identical laws,
allowing college athletes to profit off NIL.50
In a noteworthy shift away from their steadfast dedication to
“amateurism,” the NCAA suspended NIL rules that prevented college athletes from
entering paid endorsements and other sponsorship deals, and from using agents to
manage their publicity on July 1, 2021.51 However, this newfound freedom to
engage in athletics-related business results in downstream concerns surrounding
employment and fairness.
II. MEANS UNABLE TO SECURE REPRESENTATION

Action by individual states that allow college athletes to profit from their
NIL rights certainly advance the narrative. Yet, with these newfound rights comes a
host of challenges for college athletes—challenges that both the NCAA and their
member universities are ill-equipped to handle. Thus, no matter what direction the
NCAA and other government agencies take for developing their NIL policies,
adequate legal representation for athletes must be ensured in order to allow for the
success of both the athletes and their institutions alike.
A. The NCAA
Despite possessing the power to establish a nationwide NIL standard,
including the ability to provide access to legal representation and sports agents to
athletes, the NCAA has chosen not to address this issue in any responsible way.
Historically, they have opposed the opportunity to incorporate such changes by
insisting that “amateurism” is entirely contrary to the practice of compensating
athletes.52 Because amateurism is essential to the product it sells, the NCAA does
not appear to be able to position itself in a way to serve as an advocate for athletes
in any meaningful way. Given the NCAA’s outspoken scrutiny against any
advancements for college athletes including state legislation permitting paid

/tracker-name-image-and-likeness-legislation-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/Y5TH-FRRW]; Dan
Murphy, Everything You Need to Know About the NCAA’s NIL Debate, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2021), https:
//www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31086019/everything-need-know-ncaa-nil-debate
[https://perma.cc/JZ26-7BMC].
50

Reid Wilson, NCAA Surprise Leaves States Rethinking College Athlete Pay Rules, HILL (Feb. 2,
2022, 12:21 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/592477-ncaa-surprise-leavesstates-rethinking-college-athlete-pay-rules?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/UYK9-TNYZ].
51

Hosick, supra note 10.

52

Eric Carlson, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Why the NCAA Should Lose Its Tax-Exempt Status if
Scholarship Athletes are Considered Employees of Their Universities, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157, 158
(2016).
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endorsements, it seems unlikely that the organization would properly regulate
related issues without undermining NIL rights whatsoever.
Although the NCAA and their major athletic conferences produce tens of
billions of dollars in annual revenue,53 that revenue does not flow to the college
athletes who generate it, “many of whom are African American and from lowerincome backgrounds.”54 Instead, coaches like University of Alabama’s Nick Saban
and University of Kentucky’s John Calipari, reap the benefits, with salaries of roughly
$10 million a year.55 Considering the NCAA is securing the benefits of low-cost labor,
there is little incentive for these officials to enact any changes that may divert
revenue away from themselves.
The interim NIL policy was hardly designed to be a long-term solution by
the NCAA. NCAA officials have warned that universities in states with more
permissive NIL regulations can offer better benefits to recruits, as opposed to
universities in states with more restrictive NIL rules, unfairly advantaging some
schools over others.56 Moreover, athletic conferences that span several states will
have similar difficulty in enacting and enforcing regulations across state lines.57
Despite the interim policy, states have shifted the power away from the NCAA in
enacting their own laws. Federal legislation will unify these varying standards and
limit the advantage schools are currently benefitting from, purely because of their
locale.58
53

Sandeep Vaheesan, Antitrust Law is the Key to Making the NCAA Pay Student-Athletes, WASH.
POST (Apr. 1, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/01/ncaa-payathletes-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/TW2D-X2ZD].
54

NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2168 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

55

Branch, supra note 6.

56

Alan Blinder, How Blowing Up College Sports Became a Rallying Cry for Some in Washington,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/30/sports
/ncaabasketball/ncaa-college-sports-laws.html [https://perma.cc/BDV5-YZKZ].
57

Gregory Marino, The NCAA Declares Independence from NIL Restrictions, JD SUPRA (Aug. 23,
2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ncaa-declares-independence-from-nil-4713672/
[https://perma.cc/R5MX-5H8F].
58

Instead, the NCAA has shifted its focus toward Washington, further bolstering its potential
conflict of interest in the present issue. In the first six months of 2021, the NCAA spent $250,000
on lobbying, and spent $480,000 in 2020, according to federal records published by OpenSecrets.
Golembeski, supra note 49. In hopes of carving out an antitrust exemption, the NCAA has “pledged
to continue to work with Congress to adopt federal legislation to support student-athletes.”
Blinder, supra note 56; Molly Hensley-Clancy, Senators Chide NCAA for Not Solving Athlete-Pay
Issue as Fast Federal Help Looks Unlikely, WASH. POST (June 9, 2021, 2:18 PM), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/06/09/ncaa-congress-nil-hearing/
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B. Employee Status
In turning away from the possibility of making these changes through the
NCAA, a common consideration has been classifying college athletes as employees
and paying them through employment compensation. The full ramifications of
treating college athletes as employees are yet to be fully realized, however, such
reclassification likely poses many important issues to both the college athletes and
their respective institutions. Though, this very consideration has recently gained
traction under the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).59
i.

The National Labor Relations Board

The NLRB, an independent federal agency charged with safeguarding
employees’ ability to collectively bargain and ensuring fair labor practices,60 has
witnessed earlier efforts attempting to classify college athletes as employees.61
More recently, however, NLRB general counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo, has left many
questioning whether the NLRB’s position has begun to shift. 62 In 2021, Abruzzo
released memorandum GC 21-08, arguing that some college athletes should be
treated as employees under § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and
common law definition of employees, affording them all rights and protections
under federal labor laws.63 Essentially, this would extend § 7 rights and protections
to college athletes and opens to the door for athletes to start or resume organizing
[https://perma.cc/XCP2-6SXJ]; Billy Witz, Bill Offers New College Sports Model: Give Athletes a Cut
of the Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/sports
/ncaafootball/college-athlete-bill-of-rights.html [https://perma.cc/D68X-D7CL].
59

Memorandum GC 21-08 from Jennifer A. Abruzzo, Statutory Rts. Players Acad. Inst. (StudentAthletes) Under the National Labor Relations Act, N.L.R.B. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS. (Sept. 29, 2021)
[hereinafter N.L.R.B. Memorandum].
60

Ross Dellenger, The Next Frontier in College Sports: The Unionization of College Athletes,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/2021/09/30/nlrb-advisory-opensnext-21frontier-college-sports-unionization/ [https://perma.cc/96LE-FXBB].
61

Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons Learned from
Northwestern University, and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes Rights Movement, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 1627, 1649 (2017).
62

N.L.R.B. Memorandum, supra note 59.

63

Id. GC 21-08 proscribes the use of the term “student-athlete” as an inherent misclassification.
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efforts, labor protects, walkouts, strikes, and other protected concerted activity.64
Section 152(3) of the NLRA defines an ‘employee’ broadly, subject to few
exceptions.65 Notably, these exceptions do not include any exceptions that suggest
the inclusion of university employees, football players, or students.66 Meanwhile,
the common law defines an employee as a person “who perform[s] services for
another and subject to the other’s control or right of control.”67 In determining
which players at academic institutions are employees, a persuasive factor is the
amount of revenue that the sport brings to the institution, its conference, and the
NCAA.68 Importantly, this fact-specific analysis will likely yield disparate results when
evaluating college athletes across conferences and sport size.69 Thus, even if the
NLRB were to step in, it would be unclear which students would therefore qualify as
an employee. This result would only further muddy the waters for determining how
college athletes are compensated for use of their NIL rights.
Of additional importance, GC 21-08 declares a joint employer theory of
liability because players at academic institutions perform services for and are
subject to the control of the NCAA and their athletic conference, in addition to their
college or university.70 Without a joint employer framework, the NLRB have lacked
the authority to assert jurisdiction over the entire Big Ten Conference because all
the Big Ten schools were public, state schools.71 Thus, they were outside of the
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NLRB’s jurisdiction and under the jurisdiction of state labor laws.72 By treating the
NCAA and athletic conferences as a joint employer, the NLRB thereby extends its
jurisdiction over an entire conference, including its public schools.73
The extent of treating athletes as employees is yet to be known, but this
heightened status poses numerous issues. Deeming college athletes as employees
may result in both universities and the NCAA losing their § 501(c)(3) non-profit
designations.74 This could have potentially far-reaching consequences, as such
status exempts the NCAA and universities from federal income tax. Under §
501(c)(3), the NCAA is tax-exempt because it is “organized and operated exclusively
. . . to foster . . . amateur sports competition.”75 Universities, on the other hand, are
considered a non-profit due to their educational mission.76 Thus, if players are
compensated through NIL deals and considered employees, the NCAA and its
member organizations risk losing its tax-exempt status.77 Employee status can also
impact college athletes’ eligibility for federal financial aid and leave their
scholarships susceptible to federal taxation.78 Students on international visas may
be placed in a situation where NIL deals violate the terms of their student visa,
complicating their ability to participate in NCAA athletics.79 This status, in
accordance with GC21-08, also places athletes at risk of termination by their new
employer, the school and conference.80 Should college athletes be reclassified as
employees of their academic institution to earn compensation, which can be used
for representation, legislation will still be required to restructure the system the
NCAA and universities are predicated upon. Instead, to avoid the intricacies of
federal taxation and tax-exempt status, it is more efficient to enact legislation that
achieves the goals employee-status is attempting to achieve, such as
representation, rather than enact legislation to work around the issues posed with
this status.
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ii. Antitrust’s Non-Statutory Exemption
Perhaps the furthest reaching issue in categorizing college athletes as
employees is one at the center of the clash between federal antitrust and labor laws.
GC 21-08 extends NLRA protections to players at academic institutions. Where these
players were previously subject to the control of their universities and the NCAA, §
7 of the NLRA provides the opportunity to collectively bargain, like the NFL, NHL,
and MLB. In the context of professional sports, collective bargaining agreements set
forth agreed-upon rules between management and employees to include “the split
of league revenues between the teams and players, the level of salary caps imposed
to teams, player transfers restrictions, player safety issues, player drafting
provisions, free agency requirements, disciplinary rules, etc.”81 GC 21-08 does not
address collective bargaining specifically, but it opens the door for college athletes
to unionize through the proper NLRB procedures. In doing so, the unionizing of
college athletes could open the gates by surrendering their antitrust rights and
allowing the NCAA to defend its concerted conduct based upon the non-statutory
labor exemption.82 The non-statutory labor exemption was fashioned by the
Supreme Court in an effort to reconcile the clash between federal antitrust and labor
law.83 The non-statutory exemption was created to exempt the actual agreements
spawned from collective bargaining between and among employers and unions
from antitrust liability.84 The Court observed that “a proper accommodation
between the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets
requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.”85 Therefore, when a union or
employer seeks “to attain goals not specifically permitted by any statute but
sanctioned by the policy in favor of collective bargaining under the NLRA, the courts
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have exempted the conduct from antitrust liability.”86
Interestingly, for the NCAA, engaging in collective bargaining could provide
relief from further antitrust lawsuits, as well as pressure from Congress.87 Yet,
collective bargaining between the NCAA and college athletes is not as
straightforward as the analysis for the negotiations of their professional
counterparts. Due to the inclusion of public and private institutions, it is unlikely that
the NCAA will obtain the same exemptions from antitrust scrutiny that the
professional leagues enjoy. It would also require the NCAA to abandon its claim that
college athletes are students, not employees.88
The Supreme Court has yet to delineate a precise test for this exemption,
leaving lower courts the difficult task to define the boundaries.89 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied a test which holds that “the parties to an
agreement restraining trade are exempt from antitrust liability only if (1) the
restraint primarily affects the parties to the agreement and no one else, (2) the
agreement concerns wages, hours, or conditions of employment that are mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, and (3) the agreement is produced from bona fide
arm’s length collective bargaining.”90 Given the uncertainty of a potential finding of
the non-statutory labor exemption and the success of O’Bannon and Alston,
employee status is hardly appealing considering the weighty sacrifice of antitrust
protections. Antitrust law has proven to be one of the largest bargaining chips in the
hands of college athletes. By forfeiting these claims, it would shift further power into
the hands of the NCAA.
In June 2021, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the NCAA was in
violation of federal antitrust laws when placing limits on the education-related
benefits that schools can provide to their athletes in National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Alston.91 This antitrust lawsuit was brought by current and former
college athletes against the NCAA and major athletic conferences, challenging
restrictions on compensation that barred college athletes from receiving fair-market
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compensation for their labor.92
The Court’s unanimous decision, written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, held that
the NCAA could restrict benefits unrelated to education, such as cash salaries, but
the NCAA could no longer restrict benefits related to education.93 Under a rule of
reason analysis, the Court determined that NCAA regulations limiting educational
benefits had an anticompetitive effect.94 The limitation of educational benefits is
essentially the NCAA’s establishment of a ceiling for the amount of educational
benefits member schools could offer athletes. Ultimately, this means that schools
could not offer common additional benefits, such as additional tuition for graduate
or vocational school, paid internships, or tutoring fees.95 The Court reasoned that
the athlete-plaintiffs demonstrated the NCAA could maintain a distinction between
college and professional sports, i.e., the “tradition of amateurism,” with
substantially less restrictive alternative rules.96
Alston remains a narrow legal opinion that applies antitrust law to the
NCAA’s fixed-sum educational benefits offered to scholarship athletes. However, it
signals a shift in the application of relevant regulation and treatment of college
athletes. With the rulings of O’Bannon and Alston and major congressional
92
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developments in antitrust, specifically in the technology industry, forfeiting antitrust
claims through the non-statutory exemption against the NCAA is incredibly
unappealing. Rather than college athletes becoming employees, congressional
interference will minimize these worries, ensuring that conferences and the NCAA
can maintain their § 501(c)(3) designations, maintain federal tax-free scholarships,
and safeguard college athletes’ federal antitrust claims against the NCAA and
conferences.
III. THE SOLUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE FEDERAL LAW ENSURING
ACCESS TO REPRESENTATION

Considering the vast social, economic, and legal advantages to be gained
from legislation, the implementation of a federal law represents the most efficient
and equitable method for establishing a more balanced dynamic between college
athletes and the NCAA. Federal legislation facilitates a robust discussion and
negotiation period to resolve the remaining policy concerns, including the allocation
of revenue streams to athletes who play non-revenue-raising sports, Title IX
compliance, salary caps, as well as the implementation of collective bargaining
protections while avoiding employee classification. Moreover, federal legislation
circumvents problems like taxing scholarships and varying state standards. In an
effort to create a national NIL framework, several bills have been introduced in
Congress. Each of the bills vary in terms of restrictions imposed on the NCAA, if any,
and rights and protections afforded to athletes, as reflected by these three
particular examples.
Senator Roger Wicker, a Republican of Mississippi, introduced the College
Athlete and Compensation Rights Act (“CACRA”), which adopts a limited scope and
deference to the institutional status quo.97 The bill allows college athletes to earn
NIL compensation “commensurate with market value.”98 Practically speaking, this
may allow governing authorities the power to approve or disapprove of NIL deals
based on their cash value.99 Moreover, CACRA limits NIL eligibility to college athletes
who completed twelve percent of the college credits required for graduation and
prohibits college athletes from entering into NIL agreements that might conflict with
existing college sponsors.100 Though, it allows college athletes “to obtain and retain
a certified agent for any matter or activity relating to such covered compensation,”
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but does not provide a guarantee to such representation and requires any
representative to report the details of each transaction to the university.101 CACRA
further seeks to establish an independent agency, subject to the Federal Trade
Commission for any violations.102 Most notably, CACRA provides the NCAA, athletic
conferences, and universities broad exemption from antitrust scrutiny.103
In contrast, Senator Cory Booker, a Democrat of New Jersey and former
Stanford University athlete,104 championed an ambitious player-friendly proposal,
titled the College Athletes Bill of Rights (“CABOR”).105 Booker cites his own
experience as a collegiate football player, as well as conversations with college
athletes that “centered on the racial inequities of an unpaid, largely Black work force
generating millions for largely white coaches and administrators” as motivation for
its drafting.106
CABOR would guarantee lifetime scholarships, long-term health care,
regulates sports agents, government oversight of health and safety standards,
public reporting of booster donations, unrestricted transfers, and create a
commission with subpoena power to ensure compliance.107 Moreover, it sets health
standards, including concussion protocols and the investigation of sexual assault
cases, and sets a salary cap for coaches and administrators.108 Perhaps to appeal to
those across the aisle, CABOR allows state governments to restrict college athletes
from endorsing certain product categories, such as gambling and alcohol-related
products, so long as such state laws equally restrict universities in such categories.109
CABOR proposes a bold revenue-sharing provision that would require
colleges to share the profits equally with the athletes who generate them in sports
where revenues exceed the costs of scholarships across an entire division.110 Using
data provided by universities to the Department of Education, this “would mean
payments of $173,000 a year to football players, $115,600 to men’s basketball
players, $19,050 to women’s basketball players, and $8,670 to baseball players who
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are on full scholarship.”111 The bill further seeks to establish a congressional
oversight board, the Commission on College Athletics (“Commission”).112 Within the
Commission, various councils, including an athlete advisory council, would be
established to provide “advice and expertise.”113
Representative Anthony Gonzalez, a Republican of Ohio, and
Representative Emanuel Cleaver, a Democrat of Missouri, re-introduced an
amended bi-partisan NIL bill called the Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act
(“LPFA”).114 The LPFA seeks a middle ground compromise “between CACRA’s
deference to the status quo and CABOR’s expansive approach.”115 Like both CACRA
and CABOR, LPFA generally prohibits the restricting of college athletes’ ability to
earn compensation through NIL deals.116 Like CACRA, it limits athletes from working
with companies associated with drugs, alcohol, gambling, or adult entertainment.117
Also like CABOR, LPFA maintains that any institution limiting college athlete NIL
activity in a particular category must also abstain from engaging with that same
category.118 The proposal also preempts state NIL laws and amends the Higher
Education Act of 1965 to allow students to enter an agency contract.119
These proposed bills encompass distinct legislative approaches. However,
they each fail to adequately balance the rights of college athletes against the
business interests of the NCAA that would pass bipartisan scrutiny, be workable in
a practical sense, and explicitly provide any assurance of access to representation.
A. Establishment of an Enforcement Body
The establishment of an enforcement body is essential to properly
implement new regulations and monitor violations of rules governing college
athletes. The current intercollegiate athletic enforcement body has repeatedly
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failed to uphold their self-made standards for rules violations.120 State-by-state
enforcement would be ineffective because each authoritative body would be
incentivized to design a scheme to favor its own athletes. Thus, there is a need to
delegate enforcement power to a task force, separate from the NCAA and its
member institutions. On a practical level, this task force can function within the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), as proposed by CACRA,121 and would allow for a
national standard to appropriately promulgate endorsement policies and adjudicate
disputes to protect college athletes and promote fair competition.
A federal oversight enforcement body provides a level of consistency that
is not feasible, should it be left to the states or NCAA. The transparency afforded by
FTC oversight provides the ideal mechanism, as an uninterested party, for resolving
intercollegiate athletic violations and disputes without unnecessarily involving
courts.122 Since its inception in 1915, the FTC has long ensured the protection of
consumers and promotion of fair competition.123 As a well-established and
respected entity, it is well-suited to oversee new regulations involving
intercollegiate athletics by providing stability and predictability in a rapidly evolving
industry.
B. Restructuring Flows of Revenue
The NCAA’s suspension of NIL rules and state legislation restricting
limitations imposed by universities, athletic conferences, and the NCAA, now
requires college athletes to navigate a complicated legal and taxation landscape, in
addition to fulfilling their academic and athletic commitments. Recognizing that
these students are largely unsophisticated individuals carrying heavy academic
obligations while newly living independently, they are unlikely to fully appreciate
the ramifications of entering contracts offered to them by outside promoters. While
some legislative proposals envision allowing athletes to contract with agents to
provide guidance and representation through NIL contract negotiations, none of the
proposals address the need for such representation to be guaranteed.
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Nor do any of the proposals consider how a college athlete will compensate
these professionals. Although some athletes have the resources to compensate
representation and therefore understand their contractual duties, this privilege is
not universal. Athletes who do not have the means to obtain representation should
not be disadvantaged by predatory contracts simply because they do not have the
same resources as other athletes. NIL opportunities vary widely across sports and
rosters. Adequate representation is not realized if it is only achievable for college
athletes with ample NIL opportunities and ample financial resources. Cameron
March, a member of the women’s golf team at Washington State University, called
for congressional intervention. “I know this too well as a female athlete of color,
currently playing women’s golf, a sport that isn’t the most lucrative or visible.”124
She continued, “This is why I feel as though it’d be wishful thinking to believe that
someone like me would ever be on an equal financial playing field as a star
quarterback.”125 With glaring disparities, it is not unreasonable to assume that
athletes with limited opportunities will likely forsake representation.
This problem of representation can be resolved through federal legislation
to create a fund or revenue redistribution model to provide access to representation
to all NCAA athletes. In fact, CABOR outlines two possible ways this could be done.126
A fund could be created where universities with athletic departments make
contributions determined by a Commission to be reasonable.127 Otherwise, a
standard could be set in which universities must redistribute their revenue streams
and allocate some of that to an independent fund.128 Of course, a provision such as
this may have difficulty passing bipartisan muster, but college athletes, some of
whom are minors, should not be penalized due to their limited accessibility. Now
that the Democratic party controls both chambers of Congress and the White House,
Republicans have offered measures to provide college athletes greater autonomy
but impose more limited checks on the NCAA’s power, compared to Democratic
proposals.129 Although persuading both sides of the aisle to agree on a common goal
is a daunting task, surely members of Congress will balance the century-long abuse
of power against those disadvantaged by the inability to retain sound legal advice.
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CONCLUSION

In protecting something as inalienable as one’s likeness, reliance upon any
measure other than federal legislation is no longer adequate. The development of
individual state laws surrounding NIL rights for college athletes have created a need
for a level of uniformity that can only be provided through federal legislation.
Moreover, the NCAA’s lackluster attempt at suspending its NIL rules has only
heightened the need for Congressional action. The NCAA has rid the problem by
turning to lobbying, in hopes of carving out an antitrust exception. Meanwhile,
considering college athletes as employees falls just as flat. The NCAA and
conferences not only jeopardize their § 501(c)(3) status, but college athletes then
forfeit all antitrust claims because of the non-statutory exemption and leave their
scholarships open to federal taxation.
Current bills have failed to address the vulnerability of college athletes to
the whims and disparate interests of the NCAA. Legislation must be enacted to
ensure college athlete access to adequate legal representation to navigate the
complicated landscape created by the NCAA’s failure to lead. By failing to do so,
college athletes may never seek the proper counsel and fall victim to deceptive and
predatory contracts and jeopardize their relationship with their school and the
NCAA.
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